Military Politics and Democracy in the Andes challenges conventional theories regarding military behavior in post-transition democracies. Through a deeply researched comparative analysis of the Ecuadorian and Peruvian armies, Maiah Jaskoski argues that militaries are concerned more with the predictability of their missions than with sovereignty objectives set by democratically elected leaders. Jaskoski gathers data from interviews with public officials, private sector representatives, journalists, and more than 160 Peruvian and Ecuadorian officers from all branches of the military. The results are surprising. Ecuadors army, for example, fearing the uncertainty of border defense against insurgent encroachment in the north, neglected this duty, thereby sacrificing the states security goals, acting against government orders, and challenging democratic consolidation. Instead of defending the border, the army has opted to carry out policing functions within Ecuador, such as combating the drug trade. Additionally, by ignoring its duty to defend sovereignty, the army is available to contract out its policing services to paying, private companies that, relative to the public, benefit disproportionately from army security. Jaskoski also looks briefly at this theory's implications for military responsiveness to government orders in democratic Bolivia, Colombia, and Venezuela, and in newly formed democracies more broadly.
Acknowledgments Acronyms and Abbreviations 1. Military Mission Performance in Latin America Challenges to Security and Democratic Civil-Military Relations in the Andes Explaining Military Mission Performance in Democratic Latin America Case Selection: A Focus on the Army in Peru and Ecuador The Data Overview of the Analysis 2. Civil-Military Relations in Democratic Peru and Ecuador High Constraints on Peru's Military Low Constraints on Ecuador's Military 3. Army Mission Performance in Post-Transition Peru and Ecuador, 1980s1990s Sovereignty before Policing Deviations: Contradictions in Missions and Sovereignty Neglect Alternative Explanations 4. Mission Constraint and Neglect of Counterinsurgency: Peru since 2000 Staying in the Barracks Insecurity in Sendero Zones Predictions of the Legitimacy, Professionalism, and Resource Maximization Hypotheses Army Inaction Restrictions on Army Autonomy Contradiction through Mission Constraint The Source of the Senior Cohort's ""Need"" for Autonomy Neglect of Counterinsurgency as a Way to Maintain Predictability for Patrols Return to Assertive Counterinsurgency Narrow Mission Beliefs and Minimal Police Work 5. Mission Overload and Neglect of Border Defense: Ecuador since 2000 Neglecting a Porous Border while Policing the Interior Insecurity in Northern Ecuador Predictions of the Legitimacy, Professionalism, and Resource Maximization Hypotheses Assertive Policing Overwhelming Security Responsibilities Policing to Avoid Obsolescence Contradiction through Mission Overload Managing the Contradiction The Contradiction Escalates Alternative Explanations: Revisiting Legitimacy 6. Battalions for Hire: Private Army Contracts in Peru and Ecuador Resource-Hungry Army Units Local Client Influence Limits to Client Influence 7. Comparative Perspectives on Military Mission Performance Colombia: Tolerance of Policing amid Ongoing Insurgency Venezuela: Mission Loss, Organizational Trauma, and Rejection of Police Work Bolivia: Policing despite Organizational Trauma Extreme Executive Control: Trends in Venezuela and Bolivia Reflections on Assigning Militaries to Conduct Police Work Appendix: Field Research Methodology Notes References Index
""Academically rigorous... the specialized work belongs in college and university libraries with significant holdings in comparative politics and Latin American studies.""
