Social robots are an increasingly integral part of society, already appearing as customer service assistants, care-home helpers, teaching assistants and personal companions. This book argues that the wider inclusion of social robots in our society is having a revolutionary impact on some of our key intuitions regarding ethics, metaphysics and epistemology and, as such, will put pressure on many of our best theories. Social robots elicit an emotional and social response in humans that some have taken to be evidence that robots deserve moral consideration. Others have argued that, as robots are only machines, we should avoid designing robots that encourage emotional engagement. The fictional dualism model provides a new way for us to view social robots and a new route for our continued relationship with them. When we engage with a social robot, we create a fictional overlay that has wants, needs and desires. Our emotional attachment to social robots is a natural continuation of our relationship to fiction: a life-enhancing and important connection, but not one that prompts moral consideration for the fictional entity. In this book, Paula Sweeney shows how the fictional dualism model of social robots differs from other popular models. In addition to providing a distinctive and ethically appropriate framework for emotional engagement without moral consideration, the model provides conditions for trusting social robots and, uniquely, allows us to individuate social robots as distinct persons, even in contexts in which they share a collective mind.
Paula Sweeney is senior lecturer at the University of Aberdeen. She previously published in philosophy of language and the philosophy of time but most recently has been gripped by philosophical questions arising from our engagement with robots and other social technologies.
Introduction Chapter 1. What Can Philosophy Teach Us About Social Robots? Chapter 2. Humans and Robots Chapter 3. Social Robots and Moral Consideration Chapter 4. The Fictional Dualism Model of Social Robots Chapter 5. Robots and Identity Chapter 6. Trusting Social Robots Chapter 7. Robot Right and Indirect Harms Conclusion Bibliography Index About the Author
Paula Sweeney presents a compelling new theory of social robots: the fictional dualism model. Strikingly, Sweeney thinks it makes sense to respond emotionally to social robots, but that it is a category mistake to treat them with moral consideration. Why? Sweeney's intriguing suggestion is that social robots are embodied fictional characters. -- Sven Nyholm, professor of the ethics of artificial intelligence at the Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich, and author of Human and Robots: Ethics, Agency, and Anthropomorphism and This is Technology Ethics: An Introduction In times when social robots invite emotional and social responses, it is important to reflect on the ethical questions this raises. With her fictional dualism model, Paula Sweeney distinguishes between robots as technological objects and their fictional overlays. In this way, she aims to seriously analyze our tendency to anthropomorphize with robots and the role of fiction in this, without arguing that we should grant such robots moral consideration. Recommended for everyone interested in the ethics of robotics and artificial intelligence. -- Mark Coeckelbergh, professor of philosophy, University of Vienna, author of The Political Philosophy of AI, AI Ethics, and Robot Ethics
