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The Philosophy of Protest

Fighting for Justice without Going to War
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Protest is a critical part of the contemporary political landscape. Despite the prevalence of protest as a real-world practice, most liberal political theory limits its focus on protest to ideal conditions. This book takes up the question of how to think about protest, from within the context of liberal political theory, in the face of serious, substantial, ongoing, and actual injustices-in short, a theory of protest for our world. What can or must protest include? What, if anything, must it avoid? Against much of the popular discourse, the authors defend the view that suitably constrained violent political protest is sometimes justified. Violent political protest is not simply revolution by any other name-it's a last-ditch effort to remedy injustice without going to war.
Jennifer Kling is assistant professor of philosophy and director of the Center for Legal Studies at the University of Colorado, Colorado Springs. Her research focuses on moral and political philosophy, particularly issues in war and peace, self- and other-defense, international relations, protest, and feminism. She is the author of War Refugees: Risk, Justice, and Moral Responsibility (Lexington, 2019) as well as numerous articles in academic journals and edited collections. Megan Mitchell is associate professor of philosophy at Stonehill College in North Easton, Massachusetts, where she teaches classes in philosophy of race, feminism, and African philosophy. Her work is in political philosophy, particularly issues of race and racism. She has authored articles in Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Radical Philosophy Review, and Pacifism, Politics, and Feminism: Intersections and Innovations (2019).
Preface 1. A Brief (Philosophical) History of Protest and Liberalism I. Common Liberal Categories of Resistance and Protest II. Pressing the Liberal Tradition III. Moving Forward: Reimagining Liberalism 2. Bottles and Bricks: Rethinking the Prohibition against Violent Protest I. The Conceptual Argument II. Moral Considerations III. Pragmatic Considerations 3. (Re)Considering Violence I. An Ordinary Conception of Violence I.a. Subjectivity and Ideology II. Challenging an Ordinary Conception II.a. Violence as a Rights Violation II.b. Structural Violence II.c. Violence as a Violation of Integrity III. Return to Milkshaking 4. Violence as Persuasive Political Communication I. Progressing Towards Justice II. A Commitment to the Political III. Interpersonal Violence as Moral and Political Suasion 5. Responsibility and Accountability: Permission for Violent Protest I. The Political Responsibility to Oppose Injustice II. The Nature of the Political Responsibility to Protest III. Evaluating Protest from a Moral and Political Perspective 6. Attitudes and Actions: The Responsibilities of Protestors I. Analysis of the Communicative Context I.a. Dialogic Constraints on ProtestI.a.a. Prioritizing the Local 1.a.b. A Duty to Communicate with Each Other II. Protecting the Vulnerable III. Self-Respect and Violence 7. Protest and Revolution: Drawing Difficult Lines I. The Traditional Distinction Between Revolution and Protest II. Some Problems with the Traditional Account III. A Way Forward IV. Gradients, Not Bright Lines About the Authors Acknowledgements
It is often argued that political protest is legitimate only if it is non-violent, a view often attributed wrongly to Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Jr., and/or Henry David Thoreau. When some of the Black Lives Matter protests turned violent, Kling and Mitchell, like many, found themselves wondering if this could be justified. Their book explores the ethical foundations of such wondering and concludes that political violence is sometimes justified and is not always inconsistent with the principles of liberal democracy. The argument against violent acts is that they forestall the possibility of resolving conflicts through communication. The authors counter that violence-they exclude lethal violence-may sometimes be needed to assert the right of an oppressed group to enter into such communication. They ground their argument in a comprehensive survey of contemporary ethical scholarship, particularly but not exclusively by scholars influenced by the work of John Rawls. They also seek a philosophical distinction between revolutionary and non-revolutionary protest, since most people would expect states to suppress violent revolutionary protest with force. The book is conversational in tone and would foster good discussion among undergraduate philosophy students. Recommended. General readers and advanced undergraduates through faculty. * Choice Reviews *
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