Among the world's authoritarian governments have always been those based not on ideology, a leader's personal mission, or even charisma, but simply on raw power sustained by fear of punishment and hope of reward. Such regimes are described by the authors of the present volume as ''sultanistic.'' Common to all of them is the leader's freedom to exercise power without restraint, unencumbered by a commitment to law, ideology, or values. Under these conditions, corruption reigns at all levels of society. The life span of such regimes is limited, and they tend to fall under chaotic circumstances that are uniquely unfavorable to democratic transition. In this volume H. E. Chehabi and Juan J. Linz bring together a distinguished group of contributors to examine such regimes in the Dominican Republic, Cuba, Haiti, Iran, Nicaragua, and the Philippines. The authors begin by identifying common characteristics of sultanistic regimes, comparing them to totalitarian and authoritarian forms of government and tracing common patterns for these regimes' genesis and demise. They also explore their political economy and the circumstances under which they may fall victim to revolution. They then offer country studies that test the model developed in the first part of the book against the real-life experiences of governments in six nations. Contributors include Jorge I. Domínguez on the Batista regime in Cuba; Jonathan Hartlyn on the emergence, evolution, and aftermath of the Trujillo regime in the Dominican Republic; Richard Snyder on developing a new framework for the comparative analysis of the breakdown of sultanistic dictatorships; Homa Katouzian on sultanism and arbitrary government in Pahlavi Iran, John A. Booth on Somocista Nicaragua; Mark R. Thompson on Ferdinand Marcos and the sultanization of Philippine politics; and David Nicholls on the Duvalier regime in Haiti.
