Kant's Struggle for Autonomy

Raef Zreik is associate professor of jurisprudence at Ono Academic College.

Introduction Abbreviations Part 1: Kant's Strategy of Retreat Chapter 1: Autonomy in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason Chapter 2: The Autonomy of Morality Chapter 3: The Autonomy of Justice (Law) Chapter 4: The Autonomy of Public Order (Legitimacy): Kant on Revolution Part 2: Critique of Kant's Strategy of Retreat Chapter 5: The Autonomy of Public Order (Legitimacy) Revisited Chapter 6: The Autonomy of Justice (Law) Revisited Chapter 7: The Autonomy of Morality Revisited Part 3: Beyond Kant. Engagements with Current Debates Chapter 8: Wood and Willaschek: Between Law and Morality Again Chapter 9: Korsgaard on Lexical Priority, Rigorism, and the Double-level Theory Chapter 10: Herman and the Sensitivity to the Particular Conclusion

Raef Zreik shows that Kant's use of the concept of autonomy as the underlying principle of both theoretical and practical philosophy has to be distinguished from the idea of autonomous domains of virtue, happiness, and law within practical philosophy. He argues carefully and convincingly that the idea of autonomy is crucial to Kant's approach to each of these domains but that to think of them as completely separate from each other is a mistake that undermines the unity of Kant's own philosophy and a coherent approach to practical philosophy in general. This is the most extensive and thorough interpretation and critique of Kant's use of the concept of autonomy that I know. -- Paul Guyer, Brown University