Tax Evasion and the Rule of Law in Latin America

Contents

List of Figures and Tables

Preface and Acknowledgments

Introduction

1. Compliance and Enforcement

2. Measuring Tax Compliance in Chile and Argentina

3. Taxpayers’ Perceptions of Government Enforcement

4. General Deterrence: Impunity and Sanctions in Taxation

5. Specific Deterrence and Its Effects on Individual Compliance

6. The Role of Trust, Reciprocity, and Solidarity in Tax Compliance

7. Social Mechanisms in Tax Evasion and Tax Compliance

Conclusion: Tax Compliance and the Law

Appendix A: On the Data

Appendix B: A Game Theory Approach to the Logic of Tax Compliance

Appendix C: A Simulative Game: The Effects of Enforcement

Appendix D: The State, the Law, and the Rule of Law

References

Index

“Bergman’s comparative research design is exemplary, and his book may be read with profit even by comparativists who do not study taxation or Latin America. It would be a good teaching text for a graduate seminar on research methods.”

—Isaac William Martin, Perspectives on Politics