Roll over image to zoom in Click on image to zoom

No Miracles

Name: No Miracles
Brand: STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
SKU: 9780804798181
Price: 162.0 AUD
Availability: InStock

STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESSISBN: 9780804798181

The Failure of Soviet Decision-Making in the Afghan War

Price:

$162.00

Stock:

Temporarily out of stock. Order now & we'll deliver when available

Quantity:

By Michael R. Fenzel
Imprint: STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
Release Date: March 5, 2018
Format: HARDBACK
Dimensions: 229 x 152 mm
Weight:
Pages: 277

Share this product

Button Actions

Please copy the ISBN for submitting review copy form

The Soviet experience in Afghanistan provides a compelling perspective on the far-reaching hazards of military intervention. In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev decided that a withdrawal from Afghanistan should occur as soon as possible. The Soviet Union's senior leadership had become aware that their strategy was unraveling, their operational and tactical methods were not working, and the sacrifices they were demanding from the Soviet people and military were unlikely to produce the forecasted results. Despite this state of affairs, operations in Afghanistan persisted and four more years passed before the Soviets finally withdrew their military forces. In No Miracles, Michael Fenzel explains why and how that happened, as viewed from the center of the Soviet state. From that perspective, three sources of failure stand out: poor civil-military relations, repeated and rapid turnover of Soviet leadership, and the perception that Soviet global prestige and influence were inexorably tied to the success of the Afghan mission. Fenzel enumerates the series of misperceptions and misjudgments that led to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, tracing the hazards of their military intervention and occupation. Ultimately, he offers a cautionary tale to nation states and policymakers considering military intervention and the use of force.

Michael R. Fenzel is an active duty Brigadier General in the U.S. Army, currently serving as a Deputy Commanding General in the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He most recently served as a Senior Military Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Commander of the 3rd Brigade Combat Team and then Chief of Staff for the 82nd Airborne Division. He is the founder of the Council for Emerging National Security Affairs (CENSA), a life-member of the Council on Foreign Relations, and a former Director on the National Security Council Staff in the White House.

1. Introduction 2. The Soviet Failure in Afghanistan 3. Setting the stage: Evolution of Party-military Relations 4. Getting In: Leonid Brezhnev and the Soviet Decision to Invade Afghanistan 5. No retreatNo miracles: Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko in Afghanistan (1980 - 1985) 6. Gorbachev's Quest for "Reluctant, Silent Agreement" to Withdraw from Afghanistan (1985) 7. Getting Out: Gorbachev and the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan (1986-1989) 8. Losing Afghanistan

"No Miracles<\i> is a readable and valuable contribution to the existing body of work about the Soviet-Afghan War. It is a must and relevant read for international security practitioners and scholars because its conclusions have implications for civil-military relations and strategy for the current war in Afghanistan, which is a protracted stalemate."-Robert Cassidy, The Russian Review "Fenzel's analysis offers a valuable reassessment of earlier studies....This well-researched analysis is strongly recommended to students, researchers, and policy makers-military and civilian."-R.P. Peters, CHOICE "This is a great, readable work on an understudied part of the history of the Soviet-Afghan War. The argument is clear, and the evidence supports the author's thesis. This work... [opens] a new perspective on this vital war and boldly treads new ground."-James L. Britt, H-War

No Miracles

Request Academic Copy

Description

You may also like

Recently viewed