As World War II came to an end in 1945, few countries had less in common - in terms of geopolitical power - than Ireland and the United States. In this narrative history, Troy D. Davis examines the diplomatic relationship between the two nations during the seven years immediately following the war. He assesses the effect of that relationship on the subsequent history of Ireland and emphasizes the impact of Ireland's early Cold War policies on partition - the most intractable of 20th-century Irish problems. Benefiting from extensive archival research in Ireland, the United States and Great Britain, the book provides a behind-the-scenes look at such topics as Ireland's unsuccessful application for UN membership in 1946; Irish participation in the Marshall Plan; and Ireland's 1949 decision not to join NATO. Davis reveals that, in its formulation of diplomatic policy, the Irish government was hamstrung by domestic political considerations. Most notably, during the 1948 to 1951 period, electoral pressures moved the Irish coalition ministry to follow a policy of virulent but ultimately counterproductive anti-partitionism. The Irish government pursued the chimerical goal of convincing the United States to pressure the British into uniting Ireland, regardless of the wishes of the Northern majority. Davis argues that, given the importance of the United States' alliance with Great Britain, this Irish plan was extremely unrealistic. Consequently, it failed to advance Irish national interests and served instead to further entrench the border between North and South. The book should serve as a useful guide to those seeking a better understanding of the contemporary controversy over Irish partition. Students of 20th-century Irish history, American diplomatic history and Cold War history should also find this book of particular interest.
