In Market of Doom, Eliza Gheorghe offers a novel explanation for why the nuclear club remained capped at ten members even as more than thirty states have sought the bomb. Most proliferation accounts focus on why states want nuclear weapons or why suppliers offer assistance. Gheorghe examines the nuclear market-the commercial space involving suppliers, buyers, and regulators-and argues that proliferation hinges on how these actors interact under prevailing systemic conditions. When poles of power are many and great power rivalry high, regulators struggle to coordinate, suppliers compete fiercely, and proliferants can play sellers off against one another. When poles are few and rivalry is muted, regulators can build cartels that stifle competition and choke off technology transfers. Gheorghe delineates three phases of the nuclear market: competitive (1945-1974), regulated (1975-1990), and tightly controlled (1991-2014). She shows that successful proliferants like China, India, and Israel exploited the early Cold War's commercial rivalry, while latecomers like Brazil and Iraq ran into a coordinated wall of supplier discipline. As multipolarity returns, Market of Doom warns that the conditions which once facilitated proliferation are also returning, and that only international cooperation can stop what comes next.
