Why has democratization failed to curb corruption in Asian democracies? Focusing on Indonesia, Mongolia, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand, this book shows that competitive elections and democratic institutions have not necessarily produced cleaner government. Across the region, corruption has persisted, and in some cases deepened, after democratization. To explain this puzzle, Eric C.C. Chang argues that corruption depends on the institutional and electoral choices made during democratic transition. Strong executives with weak constraints gain greater opportunities to exploit public power, while non-programmatic electoral strategies create costly campaigns that encourage illicit fundraising and rent-seeking. These arrangements also make corruption more predictable for citizens, weakening public demands for accountability and helping corrupt incumbents survive elections. Drawing on surveys, cross-national data, and comparative case studies, Chang shows further how authoritarian-era choices about executive power and electoral mobilization continue to shape divergent corruption outcomes in young democracies. Persistent corruption, in turn, erodes public trust and threatens democratic consolidation. By linking authoritarian legacies, institutional design, electoral strategy, and voter behavior, Chang offers a fresh and compelling account of how authoritarian legacies and early institutional choices can shape quality of governance for decades, with far-reaching consequences for democratic consolidation in Asia.
