Learning from the Secret Past

Preface Learning from the Secret PastDavid Omand Part I: The Organization and Oversight of Intelligence1. The Post-War Organization of Intelligence: The January 1945 Report to the Joint Intelligence Committee on "The Intelligence Machine"Michael Herman Document: The Intelligence Machine 2. "A Formidable Power to Cause Trouble for the Government"? Intelligence Oversight and the Creation of the UK Intelligence and Security CommitteePeter Gill Document: Intelligence Services Bill Part II: Political Interference in Intelligence 3. The Scott Report: Intelligence and the Arms TradeRobert Dover Document: Matrix Churchill Ltd: Export Licence Applications for Iraq, September 25, 1989 4. Political Interference in the Intelligence Process: The Case of Iraqi WMDMark Phythian Document: The Butler Report: Annex B: Intelligence Assessment and Presentation: From March to September 2002 Part III: Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism5. Intelligence and Counterinsurgency: The Malayan ExperienceMatthew Jones Document: "The Special Branch Charter," Directive No. 21, Director of Operations, Malaya, 24th April 1952 6. "A Skeleton in Our Cupboard": British Interrogation Procedures in Northern IrelandRichard J. Aldrich Document6: Prisoner Handling in Interrogation Centres in Northern Ireland: Report by the Intelligence Coordinator 7. The Value and Limits of Experience in the Early Years of the Northern Ireland Troubles, 1969-1972Eunan O'Halpin Document: Visit by Secretary JIC to Northern Ireland, January 10-12, 1972 Part IV: Avoiding Surprise 8. Suez and the Threat to UK Interests OverseasGill Bennett Document: The Threat to United Kingdom Interests Overseas, October 18, 1956 9. Oleg Penkovsky, British Intelligence, and the Cuban Missile CrisisLen Scott Document: "Cuba: Threat Posed By Soviet Missiles," October 26, 1962 Document: CIA Memo: Meeting No. 1 (London) at Mount Royal Hotel, April 20, 1961 10. Avoiding Surprise: The Nicoll Report and Intelligence AnalysisMichael S. Goodman Document: "The Joint Intelligence Committee and Warning of Aggression," November 1981 11. Lessons Learned: What the History of British Intelligence Can Tell Us about the FutureRobert Dover and Michael S. GoodmanContributors Index