Table of ContentsContentsAcknowledgmentsList of AbbreviationsIntroduction Part I: Strategic AdaptationIntroduction to Part IChapter 1: IDF "Routine Security" and the Evolution of Hezbollah (1985-92)Chapter 2: Deterrence, Guerrilla Warfare, and the Establishment of the "Rules of the Game" (1993-99)Chapter 3: A Change in the Strategic Equation: The IDF Withdrawal from Lebanon (2000)Chapter 4: The Erosion of Deterrence, the 2006 War, and the Dahiya Doctrine (2000-17)Conclusion to Part I Part II: Operational AdaptationIntroduction to Part IIChapter 5: The Origins of the RMA in IsraelChapter 6: The RMA in Action: IDF Operations in Lebanon and Hezbollah's Adaptation in the 1990sChapter 7: The Rise of the IDF's Operational Theory Research Institute and Systemic Operational Design Chapter 8: The 2006 Lebanon War: Military Adaptation and CounteradaptationChapter 9: The Blame Game: A Reappraisal of the IDF's 2006 Operational ConceptConclusion to Part II ConclusionsAfterword: Back to the Future: IDF Force Planning and Hezbollah's Military Adaptation in Syria ChronologySelected BibliographyIndexAbout the Author