Mansoor Ahmed is a senior fellow at the Center for International Strategic Studies in Islamabad, Pakistan. He is a former Stanton Nuclear Security junior faculty fellow (2015-16) and postdoctoral research fellow (2016-18) with the International Security Program and Managing the Atom project at the Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center. He also served as a lecturer in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, from 2011-15.
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Introduction 1. Bureaucratic Inertia and the Nuclear Option 2. The Triumph of the Mythmakers 3. Facing the Smiling Buddha 4. The Enticing Centrifuge 5. Procurements and Politics of the Special Project 6. Trials, Tussles, and Uranium Enrichment 7. Achieving the Plutonium Ambition 8. Building the Nuclear Device 9. Competition, Command and Control, and the Nuclear Tests Conclusion Appendix 1: Major Figures in Pakistan's Nuclear Establishment, 1960-2001 Appendix 2: The Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program, 1972-2001 Appendix 3: Note on "Nuclear Danger from India" submitted to President Ayub Khan by Munir A. Khan and Abdus Salam, Summer 1967 Appendix 4: Newsletter of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission published in May 1974, a few days after India's first nuclear test Appendix 5: A.Q. Khan's handwritten private letter to Munir A. Khan, June 1976, on the status of the centrifuge project before he took over as project director a month later Selected Bibliography Index